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TIME TO RETHINK SURROGACY:  
AN OVERHAUL OF NEW YORK’S 
OUTDATED SURROGACY CONTRACT LAWS 
IS LONG OVERDUE 
CHARLES GILI† 
INTRODUCTION: THE EXISTING ILLEGALITY OF SURROGACY 
CONTRACTS IN NEW YORK 
“Making the decision to have a child – it is momentous.  It is 
to decide to forever have your heart go walking around outside 
your body.”1  This statement was made by author and educator 
Elizabeth Stone and expresses the joy that deciding to have a 
child can bring.2  Unfortunately, that decision is complicated, and 
some people who have decided to bring children into their 
families must explore alternate options to effectuate that 
decision.  Some choose surrogacy to accomplish their wish. 
Surrogacy is the process by which a surrogate mother 
becomes pregnant and carries the child to term for another 
person or persons.3  There are two distinguishable types of 
surrogacy.  Traditional surrogacy involves becoming pregnant 
through artificial insemination using the intended father or a 
donor’s sperm.4  Gestational surrogacy involves the surgical 
implantation of a fertilized embryo through the in vitro 
 
† Notes & Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review & Journal of Catholic Legal 
Studies; J.D. Candidate 2020, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2011, 
Brooklyn College. I am most sincerely grateful to Professor Margaret Valentine 
Turano for her guidance during the Note process and beyond. I also thank, love, and 
admire my wife for her tirelessness in the face of every challenge and for 
encouraging me to follow my dreams. 
1 Elizabeth Stone Quotes, GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/author/ 
quotes/251288.Elizabeth_Stone (last visited July 4, 2019). 
2 Elizabeth Stone, Fordham University, https://www.fordham.edu/info/24124/ 
elizabeth_stone (last visited Oct. 10, 2019). 
3 See Traci Johnson, Using a Surrogate Mother, What You Need to Know, 
WEBMD, https://www.webmom/infertility-and-reproduction/guide/using-surrogate-
mother#1 (last visited July 2, 2019). 
4 Id.  
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fertilization (“IVF”) process.5  In processes involving IVF, the 
surrogate usually has no genetic tie to the implanted embryo.6  
Current New York law pertaining to surrogacy contracts does not 
distinguish between the two types of surrogacy.7  New York 
Domestic Relations Law ("DRL") § 121 defines a “surrogacy 
parenting contract” as 
any agreement, oral or written, in which: a woman agrees either 
to be inseminated with the sperm of a man who is not her 
husband or to be impregnated with an embryo that is the 
product of an ovum fertilized with the sperm of a man who is 
not her husband; and the woman agrees to, or intends to, 
surrender or consent to the adoption of the child born as a result 
of such insemination or impregnation.8 
DRL § 122 declares that all such contracts violate the public 
policy of the State and are “void and unenforceable,”9 
independent of whether they are for profit.10  
While all surrogacy contracts are void in New York, the 
State takes an even harsher stance against surrogacy contracts 
for monetary consideration.11  DRL § 123 lays out the 
punishment for attempting to enter into such a contract.12  The 
parties signing the contract on both sides are subject to civil 
penalties as high as $500.13  Those attempting to facilitate any 
such contract that involves a fee can be subjected to a $10,000 
fine for the first offense and may be prosecuted on a felony 
charge for any further offenses.14  Furthermore, regardless of 
whether a surrogacy contract is for compensation, DRL § 124 
indicates that any surrogacy contract signed by the birth mother 
will not diminish her parental rights.15 
 
 
 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See generally, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019). 
8 Id. § 121.  
9 Id. § 122. 
10 Id. (stating without particularity that “[s]urrogate parenting contracts are 
hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and 
unenforceable”). 
11 Id. § 123. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. § 124. 
2019] TIME TO RETHINK SURROGACY 489 
The effect of the current law in New York is multifaceted.  
Because the law makes surrogacy contracts that are for profit 
expressly illegal,16 and also refuses to honor any surrogacy 
contract,17 even where a friend or relative is willing to act as 
surrogate, no contract may be devised to ensure that the child, 
while in the womb, is legally recognized as the child of the 
“intended” parent or parents.  Not only does this set the stage for 
a difficult legal battle if the surrogate eventually refuses to give 
the child to the intended parent or parents, but it also creates a 
potentially disastrous situation for the unborn child: if the 
intended parents die and neither has been declared a parent to 
the unborn child, the child will not be entitled to any death 
benefits from those parents.18 
Part I of this Note discusses the influential effect of the 
much publicized Baby M case19 as well as the societal perceptions 
of the time that led to the enactment of New York’s current “anti-
surrogacy” laws, DRL §§ 121–124.  Part II explores changes in 
the legal, scientific, and societal atmospheres that have rendered 
those laws archaic and unconstitutional.  Part III argues that 
needed change should come in the form of new legislation meant 
to foster, rather than burden, the formation of family. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF NEW YORK’S “ANTI-SURROGACY” 
STATUTES 
A. The Effect of the Baby M Case 
The current law in New York exists, in large part, due to the 
heavy influence of the infamous Baby M case.  To understand the 
impact of the Baby M case on New York surrogacy law, it is 
useful to look at New York’s stance immediately prior to the case.  
New York and other states had taken a neutral stance when 
considering the legality and constitutionality of surrogacy 
 
16 Id. § 123. 
17 Id. § 122. 
18 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 2-1.3 (McKinney 2019) (stating that 
dispositions to “children” will include children who are conceived during but born 
after their parents’ life, including nonmarital children). However, if the child born to 
the surrogate is not a genetic child of the parent or parents who have died, there is 
no legal basis to establish parentage after the fact for purposes of estate distribution. 
Id. (containing no relevant language to account for the given set of circumstances). 
19 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
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contracts.20  Notably, in In re Baby Girl L.J., the court validated 
a surrogacy contract.21  A couple had signed a surrogacy contract 
with a woman who agreed to bear a child for them via artificial 
insemination using the husband’s sperm, and the couple agreed 
to pay the woman $10,000.22  As there were no New York laws 
dealing with such contracts at the time, the court examined the 
elements of the case individually,23 validating the transfer of the 
child to the couple because no alternative action would have 
served the child’s best interests,24 and then addressing the 
legality of the payment to the surrogate.25  The court cited the 
holding and rationale used in a similar case that had been 
decided in the Kentucky Supreme Court—a ruling that the 
transfer of a child to the intended family and payment made to 
the surrogate mother did not violate state adoption laws.26  The 
New York court agreed, holding that there were “fundamental 
differences” that distinguished the “buying and selling of 
children,” which laws against adoption fees aim to prevent, from 
the payments made in a surrogacy contract.27  It pointed out that 
the reason behind New York and Kentucky adoption laws that 
prohibited payments was to ensure that mothers were not being 
“coerced” into parting with their children after birth.28  
Borrowing the rationale from Surrogate Parenting Associates, the 
court explained that the motive of payment in a surrogacy 
contract is inherently different: 
[t]he essential considerations for the surrogate mother when 
she agrees to the surrogate parenting procedure are not 
avoiding the consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or fear of 
the financial burden of child rearing.  On the contrary, the  
 
 
20 See generally, In re Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 978 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986) 
(ruling that a paid surrogacy contract was valid and did not violate existing adoption 
laws); Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1986) 
(upholding the formation of surrogacy contracts and voicing the court’s opinion that 
disallowing them would be a job for the legislature). 
21 132 Misc. 2d at 978. 
22 Id. at 973. 
23 Id. (parceling the case into two distinct questions: (1) whether the transfer of 
the child to the intended family was legal, and (2) whether the payment of a fee to 
the surrogate mother violated New York laws). 
24 Id. at 974. 
25 Id. at 974–78. 
26 Id. at 976–78 (discussing the rationale used by the Kentucky Supreme Court 
in Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)). 
27 Id. at 977. 
28 Id. 
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essential consideration is to assist a person or couple who 
desperately want a child but are unable to conceive one in the 
customary manner to achieve a biologically related offspring.29 
The court’s basis for distinguishing paid surrogacy contracts 
from adoption laws forbidding payment was that surrogacy 
contracts are signed prior to conception and are thus not likely to 
represent the perceived evil of a payment intended to entice 
giving up an already conceived child.30  Additionally, the court 
noted that at the time these laws were written, the legislature 
had not anticipated that advancements in science would make 
such situations possible.31  Ruling that both the payment to the 
surrogate and to the lawyer who created the contract should be 
allowed, the court stated that addressing any moral or legal 
concerns is a job to be undertaken by the legislature if at all 
necessary.32 
The case of Baby M involved a paid surrogacy contract in 
New Jersey.33  Mary Beth Whitehead was artificially inseminated 
with sperm from William Stern after signing a contract with 
William and Elizabeth Stern to carry a child for them.34  
However, shortly after the child was born, Mrs. Whitehead 
decided that she wanted to keep the baby and fled the state with 
her husband.35  The case attracted national attention.36  Articles 
flooded local and national papers with accounts of the story and 
the trial that followed.37  Originally, the New Jersey Superior 
Court validated the contract.38  However, the New Jersey 
 
29 Id. (quoting Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., 704 S.W.2d at 211–12). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 978 (stating that “this court . . . is inclined to follow the majority 
opinion [of Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc.] by finding that biomedical science has 
advanced man into a new era of genetics which was not contemplated by . . . the 
New York legislature when it . . . prohibit[ed] payments in connection with an 
adoption”). 
32 Id. 
33 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234–35 (N.J. 1988). 
34 Id. at 1235–36. 
35 Id. at 1237. 
36 See generally Robert Hanley, Father of Baby M Granted Custody; Contract 
Upheld; Surrogacy is Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1987, at A1; Iver Peterson, Baby M’s 
Future, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1987, at A1; Robert Hanley, Surrogate Mother Battle 
Goes to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1987, at 3; George Andreassi, Surrogate Mother 
Mary Beth Whitehead Admitted Today She Made..., UPI NEWS (Feb. 9, 1987), 
https://www.upi.com/5733843; Elizabeth Kolbert, In Struggle For Baby M., Fierce 
Emotion and Key Legal Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1986, at 25. 
37 See sources cited supra note 36. 
38 In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (holding 
that once the surrogacy contract is signed, the surrogate could still refuse until the 
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Supreme Court reversed.39  In an opinion seething with 
skepticism towards surrogacy, Chief Justice Wilentz explained 
why such contracts violated public policy.40  His language 
demonstrated a harsh opposition toward such contracts.41  In the 
end, the Sterns were granted custody based upon the best 
interests of the child.42  Prior to the case, surrogacy, and 
especially surrogacy contracts, had received limited national 
exposure.43  Baby M thrust the subject into the spotlight.44  
Unfortunately, that spotlight was ill-natured, and based at least 
partially upon the selective media portrayal and a ruling filled 
with harsh criticism, many states rushed toward policies against 
such contracts.45 
Cases following Baby M were heavily influenced by the New 
Jersey court’s rationale.46  New York was not beyond the reach of 
this effect.  Soon after the Baby M decision, a case involving a 
paid surrogacy contract was heard in Kings County, New York.47  
In re Adoption of Paul involved a contract that, in the words of 
the court, was “virtually identical” to the contract addressed in 
Baby Girl L.J.48  Despite the similarities, despite the prior New 
York ruling, and despite the fact that the legislature had passed 
no new laws, the court in Paul adopted the stance taken by the 
 
time of conception but not after) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 
1988). 
39 Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234–35. 
40 Id. at 1240–42. In his opinion, Justice Wilentz describes the intended parents 
as the “adoptive couple” who had entered into a “coercion [] contract.” Id. at 1240. He 
goes on to discuss that there is potential for “baby-bartering” in surrogacy contracts. 
Id. at 1241. Justice Wilentz then undertakes a lengthy explanation of why surrogacy 
contracts are against public policy. Id. at 1246–50. He describes how money is the 
cause of these contracts and that the underlying “evil” is that the resulting situation 
is a mother separated from her child. Id. at 1249–50. 
41 Id. at 1249–50. 
42 Id. at 1260–61. 
43 No major cases or heavily publicized events had yet drawn major media 
attention to surrogacy contracts. 
44 See generally supra note 36. 
45 See, e.g., supra note 36; infra note 53. Many articles were written about the 
Baby M case that would have likely inspired strong emotional effects among readers. 
Supra note 40. 
46 See Jane Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486–87, 488–89 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1992) (relying, in part, on the Baby M court’s equating surrogacy contracts to 
“baby-bartering” in holding surrogacy contracts to be “void and unenforceable”); In re 
Adoption of Paul, 146 Misc. 2d 379, 384–85 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (holding that 
despite prior New York case law, the court would apply the rationale from Baby M 
invalidating a surrogacy contract). 
47 Adoption of Paul, 146 Misc. 2d at 379–80. 
48 Id. at 381. 
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court in Baby M, repeatedly comparing paid surrogacy contracts 
to paid adoption and declaring the contract void as illegal.49  In 
its ruling, the court explicitly stated that it agreed with the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion that such contracts constituted 
“baby bartering.”50 New York’s movement towards its current 
anti-surrogacy status had begun. 
B. Legislation and the New York State Task Force on Life  
 and Health 
Prior to Baby M and cases adopting its rationale, New York 
lawmakers had attempted to pass legislation aimed at legalizing 
surrogacy contracts.51  In the aftermath of Baby M, in 1992, laws 
staunchly opposed to surrogacy were proposed and eventually 
enacted in the form of DRL §§ 121–124.52  These laws were a 
direct result of the recommendation made by the newly 
appointed New York State Task Force on Life and Health.53  This 
Task Force was made up of twenty-six members and consisted of 
medical doctors, lawyers, professors, priests, rabbis, and others.54  
In their official recommendation, the Task Force defined 
surrogate parenting as “a social arrangement that uses 
 
49 Id. at 381–85. 
50 Id. at 382. The court expressed that despite the fact that a New York court 
had previously dealt with a very similar situation and had chosen not to declare 
surrogacy contracts illegal, and despite there being no specific laws in New York 
dealing with surrogacy contracts, it agreed with the “infamous” Baby M case. Id. at 
381–82. The court adopted the rationale from that case, specifically relying on the 
borrowed principle that surrogacy contract agreements constitute “the sale of a 
child, or, at the very least, the sale of a mother’s right to her child.” Id. at 384–85 
(quoting In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988)). 
51 Mindy Ann Baggish, Surrogate Parenting: What We Can Learn From Our 
British Counterparts, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 217, 260–68 (1988) (explaining at 
length that proposed New York legislation known as the “Dunne Bill” sought to 
legalize and regulate surrogacy contracts). 
52 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019). 
53 See The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, Surrogate 
Parenting: Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
HEALTH (1988) [hereinafter Task Force Analysis], https://www.health.ny. 
gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/docs/surrogate_parenting.pdf (last 
visited July 4, 2019). New York Governor Mario Cuomo originally commissioned the 
Task Force in 1985 with the purpose of “assist[ing] the State in developing public 
policy on issues related to medicine, law, and ethics.” About the Task Force on Life 
and the Law, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH (Nov. 2016), https://www.health.ny. 
gov/regulations/task_force/about.htm. In the spring of 1987, in light of the Baby M 
case having given the practice of surrogacy “prominence and immediacy,” Governor 
Cuomo specifically asked the Task Force to focus its policy development efforts on 
the issue of surrogate parenting contracts. Task Force Analysis, supra, at i. 
54 Task Force Analysis, supra note 53, at Task Force Members. 
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reproductive technology (usually artificial insemination) to 
enable one woman to produce a child for a man and, if he is 
married, for his wife.”55  The Task Force opined it was in society’s 
best interest to take a stance against surrogate parenting.56  The 
Task Force based its recommendation on a variety of factors 
including the ruling of the Baby M case, private adoption laws, 
existing best interest of the child standards, and perceived 
societal attitudes toward “deep-rooted social and moral 
assumptions about the relationship between parents and their 
children.”57  The legislature accepted the Task Force’s 
recommendation and passed DRL §§ 121–124.58  These sections 
voided any contracts to the extent they dealt with surrogacy 
arrangements.59  The courts would thereafter not consider a 
signed surrogacy contract against the birth mother for purposes 
of establishing parentage of a child.60  Additionally, paid 
surrogacy contracts and the brokering of such contracts became 
punishable offenses for all parties involved.61  In particular, the 
impact of the Baby M case cannot be understated.  To this day 
New York courts ruling on surrogacy contract cases acknowledge 
the impact of Baby M on the current legal landscape.62 
 
55 Id. at iii. 
56 Id. at iv. 
57 Id. The Task Force’s report was heavily influenced by the ongoing Baby M 
case—so much so that in the introduction of the Task Force’s nearly 150-page report, 
the entire first paragraph was dedicated to rehashing the facts of the decision in 
Baby M. Id. at 1. 
58 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019). In fact, the Task Force’s 
“Proposed Surrogate Parenting Act” was adopted and enacted nearly word-for-word 
by the New York legislature as DRL §§ 121–124. Compare Task Force Analysis, at  
A-1–A-2 with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019). 
59 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2019) (declaring surrogacy contracts 
“void and unenforceable”). 
60 Id. § 124. 
61 Id. § 123. 
62 See, e.g., In re Adoption of J., 59 Misc. 3d 937, 938 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018). The 
court in this case ruled that it could not validate a surrogacy contract based upon 
DRL 121–124. Id. In doing so, the court specifically noted that “[f]ollowing the 
decision in Matter of Baby M., surrogacy was outlawed in New York.” Id. (citation 
omitted). The court went on to state that “the law remains the same as it did in 1988 
when surrogacy contracts were found to be against public policy.” Id. 
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C. Medical Technology and Societal Attitudes Toward Family at 
the Enactment of DRL §§ 121–124 
Surrogacy technology was in an early stage of development 
at the time DRL §§ 121–124 passed into law.63  The most common 
technique was artificial insemination, as occurred in Baby M.64  
IVF was still an emerging technology.65  This provides additional 
support to indicate what the legislature considered when 
outlawing surrogacy contracts.  Surrogacy situations that started 
in the same way as in Baby M were considered the norm, and 
thanks to that case, did not enjoy public support.66 
There is much speculation as to why people began to pursue 
surrogacy more frequently.  Some sources indicate that infants 
available for adoption were becoming more difficult to obtain 
around the time of this legislation.67  Others may have considered 
surrogacy because of infertility issues or health problems that 
could prohibit a safe pregnancy.  In fact, the Task Force 
specifically considered much of this in its analysis.68  However, 
while this legislation was being considered, legislators were 
generally only thinking about a very early stage of reproductive 
technology and were likely only considering the implications of 
these issues as they related to traditional families.  Legislators 
 
63 See Jeff Wang & Mark Sauer, In Vitro Fertilization (IVF): A Review of Three 
Decades of Clinical Innovation and Technological Advancement, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Dec. 2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ 
PMC1936357/ (explaining the scientific advances involving assisted reproduction 
that were occurring in the mid- to late-1980s). 
64 Id. (referring to the fact that IVF was still in the early stages of development); 
see also W. Ombelet & J. Robays, Artificial Insemination History: Hurdles and 
Milestones, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. 
gov/pmc/articles/PMC4498171/ (discussing how artificial insemination possibly dates 
back centuries and was being used effectively at the time IVF began to be used). 
65 Wang & Sauer, supra note 63. 
66 See generally Task Force Analysis, supra note 53. It seems very likely that 
while the Task Force may have realized technology in the medical field was evolving, 
it considered the practice that was prevalent at the time, namely artificial 
insemination. It is likely that it did not examine the full beneficial scope of what 
reproductive technology, including IVF, was becoming capable of. 
67 See National Committee for Adoption, Issues in Child Adoption, CQPRESS: 
CQRESEARCHER, (Nov. 16, 1984), https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document. 
php?id=cqresrre1984111600 (“Adoption experts estimate that two million American 
couples want to adopt children, preferably healthy infants or toddlers. But only 
about 50,000 healthy babies are available for adoption each year.”); Deann  
Borshay Liem, First Person Plural: Adoption History, POV (2000), http://www.pbs. 
org/pov/firstpersonplural/history/2/ (describing that in the early 1990s, many 
American citizens were seeking to adopt children in Central America). 
68 Task Force Analysis, supra note 53, at 7. 
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did not consider the effects of these issues on same-sex couples 
and individuals.  To realize this, one needs to understand that 
while New York has traditionally been viewed as reasonably 
liberal where same-sex rights are concerned, New York did not 
sanction an adoption by a same-sex couple until 1997, officially 
permit adoption by same-sex couples and individuals until 
2010,69 or legalize same-sex marriage until 2011.70  Same-sex 
marriages performed in other states were not recognized until 
2008.71  Suffice it to say, New York lawmakers were not 
prioritizing any attempt to address the effect of dwindling 
adoption numbers and anti-surrogacy contract policies on the 
same-sex community.72  Nevertheless, the laws that were adopted 
based upon the recommendation of the Task Force remain in 
effect today and are fully enforced by New York courts.73 
II. THE CURRENT LAW IS OUT OF PLACE IN A CHANGING WORLD 
A. What Has Changed Since the Adoption of New York’s Current 
Surrogacy Contract Laws? 
1. Surrogacy-Related Technology and Practice 
Our world is a different place than it was when anti-
surrogacy laws were passed in New York.  While IVF is still an 
advancing technology, it is being used both more often and more 
successfully.74  It has been implemented to assist couples and 
 
69 Jay Carmella, New York Governor Signs Law Allowing Unmarried Couples to 
Adopt, JURIST (Sept. 21, 2010, 11:18 AM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/09/new-
york-governor-signs-law-allowing-unmarried-partners-to-adoption/ (discussing how 
the bill amended the language of existing New York law so as to make it legal for 
same-sex individuals and couples to adopt). 
70 See Marriage Equality Act, A. 8354, Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) 
(legalizing same-sex marriage in New York). 
71 See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189, 192 (4th Dep’t 2008) 
(ruling that New York would honor same-sex marriages that were performed in 
other jurisdictions). 
72 Considering the facts pointed out above, specifically, that New York did not 
allow same-sex adoption or marriage until years after the Task Force completed its 
analysis and made its recommendation, it follows that the Task Force would not 
have considered the impact of a law against surrogacy contracts on same-sex couples 
or individuals. 
73 See, e.g., In re Adoption of J., 59 Misc. 3d 937, 938–39 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018) 
(ruling that the court could not validate an “illegal surrogacy contract”). 
74 See generally Wang and Sauer, supra note 63 (describing the plethora of 
advances within surrogacy-related reproductive technologies up to 2006); IVF 
Treatment ‘Safer and More Successful Than Ever’, INT’L FED’N OF GYNECOLOGY & 
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individuals who have difficulty conceiving for a number of 
reasons.75  Many couples that cannot conceive due to the 
infertility of one partner may choose to use a surrogate so as to 
have a child with the genes of one of the parents.76  Other couples 
may choose surrogacy when the woman is fertile but cannot carry 
a child due to medical concerns.77 
Beyond issues involving fertility, a major development in the 
world of IVF has been the advent of pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis (“PGD”).78  This process involves the testing of a 
fertilized embryo through the IVF process.79  PGD allows doctors 
and scientists to ensure that many genetic and sexually 
transmitted diseases are not present in the fertilized embryo.80  
Often, the women who utilize this technology suffer from such 
diseases and cannot safely carry a child to term.81  Some of these 
women and their families seek out surrogates to carry their 
genetic children.82 
2. Legal Acceptance Concerning Familial Formation 
In addition to changes in medical technology, the legal 
landscape has also changed.  More than just the legality of 
same-sex marriage itself has followed in the wake of Obergefell v. 
Hodges.  A major focus of the Court in Obergefell was the concept 
of family.83  Modern families are now acknowledged, both legally 
 
OBSTETRICS (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.figo.org/news/ivf-treatment-’safer-and-
more-successful-ever’-0015880 (noting that IVF is safer and more effective than 
ever); Maggie Fox, A Million Babies Have Been Born in the U.S. With Fertility Help, 
NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/million-
babies-have-been-born-u-s-fertility-help-n752506 (discussing the incredible leaps in 
success rates involving pregnancy through IVF technology). 
75 Traci Johnson, Using a Surrogate Mother: What You Need to Know, WEBMD 
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/guide/using-
surrogate-mother#2. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Wang & Sauer, supra note 63 (explaining what PGD is and what it is being 
used for). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Kathryn T. Drazba, et. al., A Qualitative Inquiry of the Financial Concerns of 
Couple Opting to Use Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Prevent the 
Transmission of Known Genetic Disorders, NATIONAL SOCIETY OF GENETIC 
COUNSELORS, INC. (Aug. 2013), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1007/ 
s10897-013-9638-7. 
82 Johnson, supra note 75. 
83 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599–609 (2015) (discussing the 
importance of the concept of family several times throughout the opinion). 
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and societally, in a variety of shapes and sizes.  Since Obergefell, 
federal courts have struck down multiple laws that infringed 
upon the familial rights of same-sex individuals and couples, 
including a Mississippi law that banned same-sex adoption.84  In 
Campaign for Southern Equality v. Mississippi Department of 
Human Services, Judge Jordan of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi explained the 
reasons for granting an injunction that barred enforcement of a 
law preventing same-sex couples from adopting children.85  He 
explained that the Court in Obergefell had found that laws 
against gay marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause and 
that the majority in that case “foreclosed litigation over laws 
interfering with the right to marry and ‘[the] rights and 
responsibilities intertwined with marriage.’ ”86  For similar 
reasons, in Pavan v. Smith, the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that an Arkansas law that did not allow for both 
same-sex partners to be listed on the birth certificate of their 
adopted child was unconstitutional.87  These decisions have 
effectively legalized same-sex adoption across the country.88 
B. Adverse Effects and Issues of Constitutionality 
As mentioned in the description of medical advances in IVF 
and PGD, anyone with an issue conceiving or carrying a child 
stands to benefit from these advances.89  However, the current 
law in New York refuses to acknowledge any contract involving 
an informed surrogate.90  Even if the surrogate is willing to 
proceed without charging a fee, the intended parent or parents 
cannot legally protect themselves from a devastating rebuke of 
 
84 Campaign for Southern Equal. v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Svcs., 175 F. Supp. 3d 
691, 711 (S.D. Miss. 2016). 
85 Id. at 709–10. 
86 Id. at 710. 
87 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077–79 (2017) (ruling that the Arkansas statute was not 
about genetics and instead gave special recognition to heterosexual couples, and that 
this effect was a violation of the principle set forth in Obergefell that same-sex 
couples be privy to the “constellation of benefits” that comes with marriage). 
88 See, e.g., E.L. v. V.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1019–22 (2016) (applying the full faith 
and credit clause to an adoption by a woman who had been in a relationship with 
another woman who conceived through assisted reproductive technology and with 
whom she had jointly raised such children). The effect of the decisions of federal 
courts in cases like Campaign for Southern Equality is that states have been put on 
notice that such laws will not hold up under Obergefell when challenged. 
89 See supra Part II.A.1. 
90 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2019). 
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their agreement by the surrogate.91  Apart from the emotional 
trauma this would cause, the intended parents would have 
already taken on significant medical expenses for IVF and even 
greater expenses if the process involved PGD.92  It would be 
difficult to take on such expenses while retaining even the 
slightest doubt over whether it would be possible to foresee a 
change of heart on the part of the surrogate.  Since New York 
courts will not recognize a contract made prior to the child’s 
birth, any intended parent other than a genetic father, who may 
establish parentage prior to the delivery of the child,93 will be 
unable to establish legal parentage until after the delivery of the 
child through a generic adoption order.94  Beyond the emotional 
turmoil that intended parents face when they are not legally 
acknowledged as the parents of the child whose birth they 
anxiously await, issues such as inheritance and insurance may 
come into play.95  Take, for instance, a situation in which the 
intended mother passes away before the surrogate gives birth to 
the child.  If the mother’s will bequeaths her estate in its entirety 
to her children, the yet to be legally recognized child could lose 
out on any such inheritance.96 
1. The Specific Effects of DRL §§ 121–124 on Women 
Since men may establish parentage prior to birth but women 
may not—even though the woman may be the genetic parent in 
certain situations—it is apparent that the New York law is 
 
91 Id. Since surrogate contracts have been declared unenforceable in New York, 
it follows logically that any agreement to volunteer as a surrogate comes with the 
possibility that the surrogate renege on her promise to turn a child over. 
92 Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, It’s No Walk in the Park, ALZFORUM  
(July 3, 2014), https://www.alzforum.org/news/research-news/preimplantation-
genetic-diagnosis-its-no-walk-park (stating that the cost of IVF and PGD together, 
even when covered in part by insurance, can cost about $25,000). 
93 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 564(a)–(b) (McKinney 2019) (describing the process by 
which a man may, upon an acceptable showing of paternity to the court, be declared 
the legal father prior to the child’s birth). 
94 See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2019). Since any contract 
that recognizes the intended parent, other than a man who can be declared a father 
prior to birth, is void in New York, intended parents must wait until the child is 
born and then file normal adoption paperwork afterward. 
95 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3 (McKinney 2019). 
96 Id.; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(b) (McKinney 2019) 
(providing benefits to a child that was in utero up to twenty-four months after the 
death of its genetic parent so long as stated processes were followed). N.Y. EPTL 
§ 4-1.3 provides assurances for conceptions after the death of a genetic parent who 
documented his or her wishes but does not provide any such assurance for unborn 
children in the given scenario. See generally id. 
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unfairly prejudicial against women.  Although this may not have 
been the legislature’s intent,97 the direct fallout is that every 
single woman whose child is carried by a surrogate in New York 
is barred from establishing legal parentage prior to birth.98  
Additionally, if a surrogate refuses to turn over the child and the 
mother attempts to obtain the child through legal recourse, New 
York courts will refuse to acknowledge a surrogacy contract in 
determining which woman is the mother of the child.99  
Therefore, the worst-case scenario for a mother is complete loss 
of rights to the child, whereas the worst-case scenario for a man 
who had parentage established during pregnancy or afterward 
via genetic testing would be a court battle over custody.100 
Furthermore, single women and women in same-sex 
relationships are even more likely to feel the adverse effect of the 
current surrogacy laws.  When carrying a child is not an option, 
they may choose to expand their families using the surrogacy 
process.  When they do, these women will face the same obstacles 
faced by other women, including the inability to be recognized as 
a parent prior to the birth and adoption of the child.101  However, 
unlike a single man or a couple that includes a man, single 
women and same-sex female couples will never be legally 
recognized prior to birth under the current law, even if one of 
those women is a donor of the embryo.102  Therefore, these women 
are faced with riskier factors of inheritance, insurance, and 
custody in the absence of a change in New York’s stance against 
surrogacy contracts. 
 
97 See generally Task Force Analysis, supra note 53. 
98 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2019). 
99 Id. § 124. 
100 A man who is the intended father may legally establish his fatherhood prior 
to the birth of the child. Once the child is born, the birth mother could refuse to hand 
the child over to him. His recourse would be to sue for custody. An intended mother 
could not be so recognized, so a traditional custody hearing might not be available to 
her. Any legal undertaking that she pursued in order to obtain rights to the child 
would undoubtedly be much more complicated. Conceivably, under existing New 
York laws, a court could deny the woman all parental rights. 
101 See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 (McKinney 2019). 
102 Since, in New York, the only surrogate-utilizing intended parent who may be 
recognized prior to birth would be a genetic father, neither partner in same-sex 
female couples that use a surrogate, by default, will be able to establish parentage 
prior to the birth. 
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2. The Specific Effects of DRL §§ 121–124 on Men 
Men without a partner and all men in same-sex 
relationships, face perhaps the most consistent risk of running 
into obstacles placed in their paths to family by the current New 
York law.  If these men choose to pursue parentage outside of 
adoption, the only remaining choice is to do so through surrogacy, 
and they will be forced to rely on a surrogate to carry the child 
for them.  New York’s anti-surrogacy contract laws make doing 
this within the safety of a contract illegal.103  Their only options 
become to either risk surrogacy absent a contract or formal 
agreement, or to pursue a surrogacy agreement outside of the 
state, in a more “surrogacy-friendly” jurisdiction.104 
3. New York’s Current Surrogacy Law is Unconstitutional 
In Obergefell, the Court declared same-sex marriage legal 
across the United States.105  As discussed above, cases that 
followed Obergefell solidified the concept that Obergefell is not 
limited to marriage, but extends to the benefits that marriage 
endows.106  Obergefell and its progeny are not the only cases that 
demonstrate a current legal trend towards promoting all versions 
of the concept of family.  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the 
Court stated in its now famous opinion, that “at the heart of 
liberty” is the right of a person “to define one’s own concept of 
existence.”107  Even cases that came decades before Obergefell 
and Planned Parenthood place great emphasis on the right to 
autonomy in personal and familial decisions.108  Following the 
pattern of modern legal rationale demonstrated in all of the these  
 
 
103 See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–124 (McKinney 2019). 
104 Intended Parents: Surrogacy Laws by State, SURROGATE.COM 
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-information/ 
surrogacy-laws-by-state/ (last visited June 14, 2019). Based upon its stance against 
surrogacy agreements, New York is one of only two states listed as “Non-Surrogacy 
Friendly.” Id. 
105 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
106 See Campaign for Southern Equal. v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Svcs., 175 F. 
Supp. 3d 691, 710 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (ruling that a law prohibiting same-sex couples 
from adopting was incompatible with the Obergefell ruling); see also Pavan v. Smith, 
136 S. Ct. 2075, 2077–79 (2017) (discussing the importance of the “constellation of 
benefits” that Obergefell was meant to convey). 
107 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
108 See generally Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (ruling that there is a 
fundamental right to make decisions regarding one’s children); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (discussing the overarching “penumbral” right to privacy). 
502 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:487 
cases, it is entirely out of place that any decision regarding the 
right to begin a family be outlawed based mainly upon the 
preconceived notions of what is morally proper.  
Given the current legal trend, DRL §§ 121–124, which as 
explained, restrict the smooth transitions of certain methods of 
giving birth to and rearing children, is unconstitutional.  New 
York’s anti-surrogacy contract laws could be interpreted by a 
court as in violation of the Equal Protection Clause109 and the 
Due Process Clause.110  Based on the adverse effects of New 
York’s laws, several groups may have standing to bring such a 
challenge against DRL §§ 121–124.  In particular, as laws 
outlawing same-sex adoption have been struck down, these New 
York laws, which similarly burden individuals and couples 
attempting to effect a specific familial decision, are on shaky 
ground.111  Two major rationales are considered in the Obergefell 
ruling.  The first is that the Constitution does not allow laws 
forbidding same-sex couples’ right to marry because of the liberty 
interests represented by choosing one’s own way of life and 
protecting the family structure.112  The second rationale is that 
laws forbidding same-sex marriage are particularly damaging 
considering that they serve to further harm and subjugate those 
same-sex couples.113  The Obergefell Court states that to deny 
same-sex couples the right to marry is to withhold a fundamental 
 
109 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
110 Id. (“ . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
111 Compare Campaign for Southern Equal. v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Svcs., 175 
F. Supp. 3d 691, 710 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (striking down Mississippi law that 
prohibited adoptions by same-sex couples because such decisions were meant to be 
incorporated by the Court in Obergefell) with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121–24 
(McKinney 2019). As explained, these laws effectively place what can be construed 
as an intolerable burden upon couples attempting to pursue a decision to have 
children by refusing to legally recognize agreements meant to facilitate such 
decisions. 
112 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015) (reasoning that there is a 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause that, among other things, 
includes the right to make decisions about one’s own “personal identity and beliefs,” 
and discussing that marriage choices are among the “the most intimate” of 
decisions). The Court also points out that the right to marry is important  
as it provides security and a sense of acceptance for the children of those families. 
Id. at 2590. 
113 Id. at 2590–91 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause also protects the 
right to same-sex marriage because to substantiate such law in light of the “long 
history of disapproval of [same-sex] relationships” would work further harm and 
serve to “subordinate gays and lesbians”). 
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right.114  Regarding situations not foreseen at the time of the 
ruling, the Court addressed the possibility of additional need for 
change when it stated, “[w]hen new insight reveals discord 
between the Constitution’s central protections and a received 
legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”115 
As New York laws against surrogacy contracts obstruct 
many people from legally securing their pursuit of genetic 
parentage, those who wish to fulfill dreams of family according to 
their own perceived ideals will be forced to leave the state of New 
York and seek security of contract in one of the forty-eight states 
in which surrogacy contracts are enforceable.116  These 
pilgrimages—seeking tolerance of one’s own ideas of family—are 
eerily reminiscent of pilgrimages made not so long ago by men 
and women seeking the right to gain legal acceptance of whom 
they chose to marry.117  Such a situation seems to put these laws 
in stark contrast to the principles advocated by the Obergefell 
Court.  The New York law, as it stands, has the potential to have 
a disproportionately adverse effect on any person who desires to 
pursue parentage through surrogacy and certainly represents a 
conflict with “the Constitution’s central protections”118 as they 
were understood in Obergefell. 
III. PROSPECTIVE CHANGE 
A. Pending New York Legislation: The Child-Parent Security 
Act 
The Child-Parent Security Act (“CPSA”) is currently pending 
approval in New York, and if passed will repeal  
DRL §§ 121–124.119  Additionally, the CPSA will set forth legal 
 
114 Id. at 2604–05. 
115 Id. at 2589. 
116 Intended Parents, supra note 104. Many states have laws that are favorable 
to surrogate contracts. Id. Most others do not have the dramatic “anti-surrogacy” 
laws that New York has. Id. 
117 See Traveling to Another State or Country to Marry?, LAMBDA LEGAL  
(May 27, 2008), https://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/traveling-to-another-state-
or-country-to-marry. This article, published in 2008 before the federal legalization of 
same-sex marriage, offers advice to same-sex couples who might be considering 
leaving their own states to get married. Id. The article specifically addresses some of 
the hazards involved in marrying, including the possibility of facing fines or 
imprisonment within one’s home state. Id. 
118 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589. 
119 A06959A Memo: New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of 
Legislation, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY, https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn= 
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parameters for both paid and unpaid surrogacy contracts120 and 
bestow parental rights to the intended parents under the 
contract, rather than to the surrogate.121  It will allow all 
intended parents to establish parentage prior to the birth of the 
child, eliminating many concerns involving insurance and 
inheritance.122  In recognition of the concern that such contracts 
could be misused against an uninformed party, the CPSA 
mandates that all parties involved obtain representation of 
counsel in order to ensure that they are properly informed at the 
outset of the agreement.123 
B. The CPSA or a Similar Law is Necessary in a Changing 
World 
The reasons to pass the CPSA or a similar law are in no 
short supply.  They come in the form of addressing the many 
issues above.  Modern medical technology has progressed to a 
point where new and exciting opportunities exist for the many 
groups of people who seek to pursue the constitutionally 
protected goal of forming a family.124  As these medical 
technologies have developed, our country has undergone an 
inspiring societal change.  Acceptance for the way people choose 
to live their lives has become more than just the custom; it has 
become the law of the land.125  The acceptance and regulation of 
surrogacy contracts by New York would not only be a logical and 
positive stride, but a necessary leap in keeping pace with this 
trend of acceptance.  Under a properly constructed law, people 
seeking to become parents via a viable and increasingly common 
option will not be forced to leave the state in order to obtain the 
 
A6959&term=2017&Memo=Y (last visited July 5, 2019) [hereinafter A06959A 
Memo] (stating in part that the intention of the bill is to repeal DRL §§ 121–24). 
120 Id. (“Part two establishes the requirements and procedure for obtaining a 
judgment of parentage of a child born through assisted reproduction or pursuant to a 
gestational carrier arrangement.”). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Wang & Sauer, supra note 63 (describing the advances in relevant medical 
technology). 
125 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589–90 (2015) (citing 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479,  
484–86 (1965); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 575 (2003)) (ruling same-sex marriage legal based in part upon concepts 
supported in multiple rulings within the history of Supreme Court including 
“personal choice,” “safeguard[ing] children,” and treating gays and lesbians fairly). 
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security a legal contract provides.  Additionally, intended parents 
will be legally recognized and less burdened during a time 
naturally fraught with concern.  Many of these intended parents 
have already struggled up to the point of surrogacy by dealing 
with infertility and other health or acceptance-related issues.  
Legalizing surrogacy contracts will at least assure them that 
they are legally secure in their pursuit. 
The documented legislative intent behind the CPSA states 
that “New York law has failed to keep pace with medical 
advances in assisted reproduction, causing uncertainty about 
who the legal parents of a child are upon birth.”126  It further 
states that “[c]onfusion or uncertainty regarding the parental 
rights of donors and intended parents (both genetic and 
non-genetic) who participate in the conception of the child 
through assisted reproduction is detrimental to the child and 
secure family relations.”127  These and other statements 
documented as the professed intent of the CPSA are evidence 
that legislators within New York recognize and see the need to 
resolve many of the issues referred to above.128  It also ties 
together the legal ramifications in a way that sheds light upon 
the deeper resolution proffered by the CPSA: allowing surrogacy 
contracts in New York would give legal acceptance to people 
whose goal is to begin or expand a family through surrogacy and 
entitle them to the same legal recognition granted to other 
“traditionally” formed families.  The changes proposed by the 
CPSA seek to embrace modern legal trends and would resolve 
issues of constitutionality currently inflicted by DRL §§ 121–124. 
C. Any Negatives of Recognizing Surrogacy Contracts Do Not 
Outweigh the Positives 
The arguments against allowing surrogacy contracts exist 
almost entirely in the moral, religious, and ethical realms.  While 
these represent legitimate concerns, such problems do not exist 
for the entire population.  Laws recognizing such agreements will 
not force anyone to form such contracts or to pursue surrogacy.  
 
126 A06959A Memo, supra note 119. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. In the justification of the proposed bill, it is documented that this law is 
intended, in part, to resolve the situation of the current law’s effects upon same-sex 
couples. Id. The justification notes that “[b]ecause of existing New York laws, 
couples facing infertility and same-sex couples are forced to go out of state in order 
to have a child with the assistance of a gestational carrier.” Id. 
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Some people may still fear situations such as that which occurred 
in Baby M.  Others may feel that the practice of surrogacy has 
the potential to degrade women or that women entering 
surrogacy contracts might be exploited.  Some may feel that the 
practice is offensive based upon their religious worldviews.  
However, just as the right to liberty properly allows these people 
to choose to practice their beliefs and faiths, liberty should allow 
those who need to pursue their concepts of family via surrogacy 
and those who are in a position to facilitate such pursuits to 
choose whether to exercise those options or not. 
It is important to point out that, whatever their reason, 
those who seek to disallow such legal recognition in New York 
will not, in effect, prevent surrogacy contracts from happening.  
Instead, prohibiting surrogacy contracts only forces those within 
New York to seek such contracts in other states.129  Even those 
who oppose the CPSA or any law like it do not advocate imposing 
an impossibility upon those seeking surrogacy contracts, but 
instead advocate imposing an obstacle.  This obstacle causes 
people, already tasked with great adversity, to leave New York 
and its wealth of medical facilities, and in many cases their 
home, to find unfamiliar doctors and lawyers who can offer them 
the security of knowing they can call their child their own from 
the beginning.130  The current law is not only unnecessary, but 
illogical in that it does not effectuate a proscription, but instead a 
grossly inappropriate hurdle that serves the purpose of chasing 
people from conducting their legal and medical business within 
New York.131 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s world of advanced scientific technology, 
progressive legal trends, and societally broad morals, 
anti-surrogacy laws are out of place.  Since its inception, our 
country has placed an ever-higher emphasis on the right to 
personal freedom, and our highest court has placed great 
 
129 Intended Parents, supra note 104. Refusing to honor surrogacy contracts in 
New York leaves people who want to pursue such contracts with the alternative of 
traveling to a “surrogate friendly” state. Id. 
130 Id.; see also A06959A Memo, supra note 119 (noting that existing New York 
law requires participants of surrogacy agreements “to use out-of-state clinics and 
medical professionals despite the fact that New York is home to world-class medical 
facilities and fertility professionals”). 
131 A06959A Memo, supra note 119. 
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emphasis on the right “to define one’s own concept of 
existence.”132  This same country has gone to great lengths over 
the past century to protect the rights involving the building of 
the family structure, as well as the right to make decisions 
within that family structure.  In such a country, we should pay 
particular attention to laws that burden individuals and couples 
who choose an ever-increasingly viable option to build their own 
families so that they might enjoy those rights that we have 
managed to attain.  Instead, it is more appropriate to continue to 
pass legislation that fosters familial and societal growth. 
 
 
132 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
